# Derivations ledger — Capex Watch

Updated: 2026-09-11

**What this page is for.** Capex Watch makes claims with numbers in them: that
five companies must eventually earn a certain amount to justify what they are
spending now, that a gap of hundreds of billions of dollars a year has opened
between the two, that labour's share of income is the lowest since 1947. This
page shows where each of those numbers came from and how it was worked out. It
is here so you can check the site instead of trusting it.

**Every figure is one of three kinds, and each entry says which.** *Reported*
means it comes from a company's own filing or from an official statistics
release, and the entry names the document and the date. *From the BIS* means it
comes from the Bank for International Settlements' Annual Economic Report 2026,
the report this whole site is built around, and the entry cites the page or
graph. *Worked out here* means our own arithmetic, and the entry shows the sum
so you can redo it. Where our method differs from the BIS's, the entry says so
and says why, and the site repeats the warning wherever that number appears.

**The site stays inside the BIS's model.** That report tracks five companies:
Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Oracle. Others appear on the site as
evidence beside the model, never inside its totals, and their entries say so.

**The numbers the charts run on are checked by machine.** They are listed as
data at the foot of this page. The site cannot be published while that list and
the live pages disagree, so a figure cannot quietly drift away from the entry
that explains it.

If you think something here is wrong, this page is what lets you say which
number and where the reasoning breaks. That is why it is published.

BIS citations below are to the Annual Economic Report 2026: "Ch I p. N"
(chapter pagination), Graph 11 (pp. 22–23, notes p. 35), Box C (pp. 20–21,
Graph C1).

## §1 · The bet

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| Five companies; over a trillion dollars of AI capex **across 2025–26** | BIS Ch I p. 22: the five largest hyperscalers are set to spend over $1T on AI-related capex from 2025 through 2026. The five are named in the Graph 11.A notes (p. 35): Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft, Oracle. **Fixed 2026-07-30**: the page previously said "a trillion dollars a year" — the BIS figure is two years combined. 2026 guides alone total ≈$840B/yr (see §7 split; Amazon raised 30 Jul), so the run-rate approaches but has not reached $1T/yr. |
| Spending outpaces earnings and free cash flow; gap covered by debt | BIS Ch I p. 22 and Graph 11.A (capex-to-revenue ratio + debt issuance). Sourced. |
| Canal mania / railway mania / dot-com parallels | BIS Ch I pp. 22–23 and Graph 11.C. Sourced. (Graph 11.C notes date the AI boom's capex trough to **2023** — that date anchors the §7 actuals baseline.) |
| "The five is the BIS's frame, not a census" — SpaceX as a sixth builder (added 2026-08-07) | **Named scope note**, stated on the page. The BIS names five hyperscalers; this page keeps that model intact and adds no sixth slice to the §7 ramp, gap-chart split or capex total. SpaceX is carried as evidence only, in the §1 note, the §5 circuit, the §3 third strip's worked case, the strain-chart marker and one watch-list row — every one of them labelled "not one of the BIS's five". The capex-to-revenue comparison is a *page construction* from the two companies' own releases: SpaceX Q2 2026 capex $18,369M ÷ revenue $7,814M = **2.35×**; Oracle Q4 FY26 capex $16.5B ÷ revenue $19.2B = **0.86×**, the highest of the five. Same ratio as BIS Graph 11.A (capex-to-revenue), applied to a firm the BIS did not model. |

## §2 · The revenue floor

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| Floor = capex/life + $250B opex + required return × capex | **Page construction.** The BIS's own sustainability test (Graph 11.B, Rungcharoenkitkul 2026b contest model) is different machinery: net economic surplus = revenue − capex − debt service, under "AI delivers" vs "AI disappoints" scenarios. Our floor annualises the same committed capex and adds an investors' required return instead of subtracting realised debt service — a stricter test (vindicated, not merely survived). Both ask the BIS's question: can revenue justify the committed capex? Annotated on the page. |
| Capex slider: $3–4.5T committed 2025–30, default $3.5T | BIS Graph 11.B's x-axis is cumulative AI capex committed **2025–30**, range $2.0–4.5T, with the Nvidia-CEO 2030 projection ($3–4T) marked. Default $3.5T = that projection's midpoint. The page's slider starts at $3.0T, not the BIS's $2.0T: ≈$1.3T is already spent or guided for 2025–26 alone (BIS's >$1T plus the 2026 guides), so a sub-$3T outcome by 2030 would require the build-out to nearly stop — we cut the dead range. Named deviation, justified. |
| $250B/yr fixed operating costs | Page assumption (electricity + operations, order of magnitude). Not a BIS figure. Held constant across the slider range; stated in the §2 legend. |
| Floor is static; the BIS's model is amplified (audit note, 2026-07-31) | Named limitation, stated on the page (§2 note): the floor is a linear bill — a 20% revenue miss reads as a 20% shortfall. The BIS's contest model (Graph 11.B, with cross-firm/circular financing and debt) is a financed system in which a miss repricing debt and withdrawing financing deepens the miss — outcomes are nonlinear, and the delivers/disappoints gap widens with committed capex. The same wiring runs upward in booms (equity-stake mark-ups booked as profit — Amazon's $53.4B Anthropic gain). The page keeps the legible static test and points to §5 for the amplified dynamics. |
| §2 floor expressed as a multiple of Microsoft's Office franchise (added 2026-09-03) | **Page construction**, and a scale comparator only — it divides the §2 floor and feeds nothing. Denominator: Microsoft's Productivity and Business Processes segment (Microsoft 365, Office, LinkedIn, Dynamics), trailing twelve months to 31 Mar 2026 = **$135.3B**, built from Microsoft's own reported figures as nine months FY26 ($102,149M, quarter ended 31 Mar 2026) + Q4 FY25 ($33,112M) = $135,261M. **Confirmed twice** per the standing rule: Microsoft's FY26 Q3 press release of 29 Apr 2026 (segment revenue $35,013M for the quarter, +17% yoy, with the nine-month and prior-year columns) is the primary source, and Futurum's independent write-up of the same print agrees at $35.0B and +17%; geoveu holds no record of a Microsoft segment breakout, so the primary plus one independent report stands in, as the rule provides. At the page's default sliders the floor is $1,300B/yr, so the multiple is 1300 ÷ 135.3 = **≈9.6×**. Computed live in `floorCalc()` from `OFFICE_TTM_B`, so it tracks the sliders rather than going stale; the segment figure itself moves only when Microsoft reports. Chosen as a comparator because the objection it answers is not "can a software business succeed" but "has one ever been built at this rate" — the franchise is the most successful of its kind and took four decades to reach this run-rate. |
| Floor vs annuity cross-check (audit note, 2026-07-31) | The floor charges the required return on gross cumulative capex; a textbook annuity earns it on the declining balance: annuity-equivalent floor at the defaults = $3.5T × [0.10 ÷ (1 − 1.10⁻⁵)] + $0.25T ≈ $1.17T/yr versus the page's $1.30T — the page's construction is ≈11% stricter. Neither is the BIS's formula (the BIS tests net economic surplus, Graph 11.B). Kept deliberately on the strict side; recorded here so the bias is visible. |
| Hardware life 3–6 years | Page slider. Consistent with BIS Ch I's depreciation discussion (AI hardware earns over a few years, not decades); exact range is ours. |

## §3 · The two pools

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| Global enterprise software ≈ $1.2T/yr | Industry estimate (Gartner-scale worldwide enterprise software spending). Not a BIS figure; cited in the footer. |
| White-collar wage pool: slider $18–30T, default $22T (revised 2026-07-31) | Page derivation: advanced-economy GDP ≈ $60T × labour share ≈ 60% (BIS-consistent baselines) = $36T labour income. The white-collar fraction is definition-dependent — ≈50–55% counting occupations, ≈60–70% weighting by wages — so the pool is on a slider ($18–30T ≈ 50–83% of labour income) with the default $22T ≈ 60%, the middle of the estimate range. The page launched at a fixed $30T (83% — the range's most generous end for the thesis: a bigger pool makes displacement look smaller); the audit flagged it and the slider replaced it. The BIS publishes the labour share, not a white-collar split. §4's share readout uses the same slider. |
| §3 drawn-to-scale geometry (bug fixed 2026-07-31) | The software-pool rectangle had been drawn at 136×26 px — the width from an area-correct 136×64 shape, but with the height of the strip layout — i.e. ≈0.49T-equivalent area instead of 1.2T. That exaggerated the floor-vs-software comparison ≈2.7× (the true margin of the $1.3T floor over the $1.2T pool is thin). All §3 shapes are now computed from the pool slider at one px-per-$T scale, so "drawn to true scale" is enforced by the code rather than by hand geometry. |
| The floor must draw on one pool or the other | Page framing of the BIS's tool-vs-substitution distinction (Box C contrasts tool-like general-purpose technologies with AI competing directly with human cognition, Ch I p. 21). |
| Third strip: the builders' own 2026 AI capex, $0.84T/yr (added 2026-08-07) | **Page construction**, drawn at the same px-per-$T scale as the other two shapes and registered as `aiCapexPoolT`. The value is the same $840B that splits the §7 gap band — the five's announced 2026 capex (see the §7 row) — expressed as a pool, so the two figures cannot drift: the checker fails if `AI_CAPEX_T × 1000 ≠ capexShareTotalB`. Scale check: $0.84T ÷ $1.2T = **70%** of the global enterprise-software market. Its status is deliberately *not* a third pool the floor can be paid from — capex is the bill the floor services, so revenue drawn from it is the bet paying itself; the page says so in the same breath as it draws the strip. It earns its place because it is where a rising share of disclosed AI revenue now demonstrably comes from (§5's circuit), and because omitting it would let the tool-vs-worker dichotomy imply that today's revenue must already be from one pool or the other. This is the revenue-side counterpart to the funding-side circular financing the BIS documents (Ch I pp. 22–23, Graph 11.B notes) — the extension to the revenue side is this page's, not the BIS's. |
| SpaceX as the worked case for the third strip (added 2026-08-07) | Company figures from the SpaceX Q2 2026 earnings release (SEC EX-99.1, 4 Aug 2026): AI-segment revenue $2,561M, +247% yoy, of which $2,194M is "AI solutions & infrastructure"; $14.1B of Cloud Services Agreement contracted sales, contributing $1.6B of incremental Q2 AI infrastructure revenue; nameplate compute 1.4 GW, from 0.4 GW a year earlier. Contract *terms* are **press-reported, not filed**, and labelled as such on the page: Anthropic at ≈$1.25B/month with ≥300 MW at the Memphis Colossus 1 site (announced May 2026), Alphabet at ≈$920M/month from October 2026 to June 2029 (announced June 2026), reported by CNBC/TechCrunch and Reuters via Yahoo Finance. Page arithmetic: $1.25B + $0.92B = $2.17B/month = **≈$26B/yr**, against SpaceX's own AI-segment revenue annualised from Q2 of ≈$10.2B. GPU counts differ between reports (≈220k vs ≈325k for the Anthropic deal) and are therefore not used on the page; megawatts and monthly payments, which agree across sources, are. |

## §4 · Jobs arithmetic

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| Wages displaced = required revenue ÷ capture rate | Page construction — an identity given the capture-rate definition; every input on a slider. |
| China-shock benchmark ≈ 1–2M US manufacturing jobs | Standard literature estimate (Autor–Dorn–Hanson range). Not BIS. |

## §5 · The fork

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| Bust mechanism: repricing, circular-financing unwind, capex cut as recession mechanism | BIS Ch I pp. 22–23; Graph 11.B notes define the cross-firm/circular financing and the financial-unwind scenario. Sourced. |
| Labour shock: labour share ~60% → **≈20% by around 2060** | Box C Graph C1.B, transformative-AI path (simulation runs 2030–2060); Box C text says the share "falls towards zero" in the long run — 20% is the graph's end-of-horizon reading. **Fixed 2026-07-30**: page previously said "over four decades"/"by ~2065"; the BIS horizon is 2060, ≈ −11 pts per decade. |
| "Euthanasia of the working class" gloss | Adam Tooze, Chartbook 456 (his Keynes paraphrase). Attributed external commentary, not BIS. |
| Demand-bottleneck twist: displaced workers are lost consumers; growth ends below trend | Box C pp. 20–21: under the demand bottleneck, output growth rises before falling below its historical trend; the consumer base erodes as automation diverts wage income. Sourced (page wording is a close paraphrase). |
| Fork chart paths | Stylised after Box C Graph C1.A (labelled stylised on the page). 2% historical trend is the BIS's business-as-usual growth rate. |
| The circuit diagram — circular financing with figures on every arrow (added 2026-08-07) | **Page construction illustrating a BIS mechanism**, annotated as such on the page: the BIS defines the cross-firm and circular financing (Ch I pp. 22–23; Graph 11.B notes) but publishes no such diagram. Arrow provenance, left to right: (1) Amazon's equity stake in Anthropic and the **$53.4B** mark-up within its **$62.6B** Q2 2026 net income — Amazon's Q2 release, already sourced in the §7 row; (2) Anthropic → SpaceX at ≈**$1.25B/month** for ≥**300 MW**, press-reported terms (see the §3 row), not a filing; (3) Alphabet → SpaceX at ≈**$920M/month** from October, same status; (4) SpaceX → Nvidia, **$15,828M** of AI-segment capex in Q2 2026, from the SpaceX release — the *destination* of that capex is not itemised in the release, and Nvidia's position as the supplier is the page's existing framing of its watch-list row, not a disclosed SpaceX vendor breakdown. The return leg is deliberately drawn dashed and labelled "not cash but a price": the loop closes through a mark-to-market, not a payment. The soft-backlog point uses the release's own Note 2, which defines contracted sales as covering only the non-cancellable, enforceable period — which is why $14.1B of booked contracted sales sits far below the reported headline value of the same agreements. |

## §6 · The growth dial

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| Dial machinery: capital's claim doubles ($24T → $48T/yr) and is fixed; labour receives the residual | **Page construction** — a deliberately simplified residual-claim model, not Box C's task-based general-equilibrium model. Baselines: GDP $60T × 40% capital share = $24T; "the bet pays off" = that claim doubles in 15 years. Annotated on the page. |
| Readouts at g = 3%: labour share 48%, labour income $45T | Arithmetic check: GDP 60×1.03¹⁵ = $93.5T; labour = 93.5 − 48 = $45.5T; share 48.6%. ✓ |
| Wage-par growth = 3.2% | Solve (60·(1+g)¹⁵ − 48)/36 = 1.02¹⁵ → g ≈ 3.21%. ✓ |
| ≈7–8 pts of labour share per pp of growth | Check at g = 2.5% vs 3.5%: shares 44.8% vs 52.2% → 7.4 pts/pp. ✓ |
| No-substitution scenarios: labour share never moves at any growth rate | Box C: business-as-usual and bounded-productivity-boost scenarios keep labour the binding input. Sourced. |
| **OPEN QUESTION: the 60% labour-share intercept (raised 2026-09-03)** | §4 derives labour income as GDP $60T × 60%, and §6 fixes capital's claim at 40% × $60T = $24T; both start from the same intercept, and it is **not** in the machine-checked constants registry — it lives as literals in the §6 dial and in §4's prose note. Two findings sit against it. (1) It is a **model parameter, not a measurement**: Box C says the model economy's labour share before transformative AI is matched to data and established estimates, so the BIS publishes no advanced-economy labour-share series for this page to track. Earlier ledger wording called it a "BIS-consistent baseline", which is defensible; describing it as the BIS's published figure would not be. (2) On the level-comparable whole-economy measure (see the AMECO row in §7) **no developed bloc reads 60%** — euro area ~57%, EU ~56%, US ~54%, Germany ~60% alone. Moving the intercept would shift every §4 pool readout and the whole §6 dial, so it is **the owner's decision, not a print's arithmetic** (BIS-fidelity rule, point 3). Left at 60% pending that decision, with the observed series carried beside the model instead. If it stays, this row is the justification: the page's job in §6 is to mirror Box C's model, not to re-estimate it. |
| Horizon bridge: 15-year dial vs 2030 capex model (stated 2026-07-31) | Named seam, stated on the page (§6 intro clause + provenance note). The two horizons mirror the report's own structure — Chapter I tests the boom to 2030, Box C runs the transformation over decades. The dial's premise (capital income doubling, +$24T/yr) is not derivable from the §2 floor ($1.3T/yr of revenue): meeting the floor funds the build-out; the doubling requires the substitution thesis to play out economy-wide afterwards. The floor tests the down payment; the dial prices the claim. |
| Reality-check chart: a decade of AE growth, US vs rest (added 2026-07-31) | US and advanced-economies annual real GDP growth 2016–2026 from the IMF World Economic Outlook datamapper (series NGDP_RPCH, codes USA and ADVEC, July 2026 vintage; 2026 is the WEO projection — the datamapper rounds AE 2026 to 1.8% where the update text says 1.7%). The rest-of-bloc line is **derived**: row = (ae − w·us)/(1−w) with w = 0.45, the US weight under PPP-style aggregation (market prices ≈0.48; the FAQ widget's 40–55% slider spans the range) — a page construction, sensitivity ≈±0.1pp on the derived line. Refresh with new WEO vintages, not per print. Reference lines are the §6 dial's own anchors (2 / 3.2 / 3.5). |
| 40-year chart: BIS line to ≈20% by 2060, then toward zero | Box C Graph C1.B reading (see §5 row). **Fixed 2026-07-30** — endpoint moved from 2065 to 2060; slope label −11 pts/decade; the line continues declining past 2060 per Box C's "towards zero". Historical line: stylised advanced-economy average, ≈ −1 pt/decade post-1980 (labelled stylised). |

## §7 · The scoreboard

**Moved 2026-09-11.** The scoreboard — the three clocks, the gap chart, the
strain chart and the watch list — lives on its own page, `tracking.html`
("Tracking the bet" in the site nav); the front-page essay ends at §6 with a
pointer. The section number is retired on the front page rather than reused,
as §8 was, and this ledger keeps the heading for its rows. One construction
changed in the move: the gap chart's required ramp scaled the §2 floor as the
sliders set it; on the tracking page it is drawn at the sliders' defaults
($3.5T over 2025–30, 5-year life, 10% return, $250B fixed opex → $1.3T/yr).
`check-derivations.py` holds those four defaults equal to this registry and to
`index.html`'s slider attributes, and reads the `GAP` data from `tracking.html`.

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| Three clocks | Market patience: BIS Ch I pp. 23–25 (valuations, risk premia, financial stability). Depreciation wall 2027–29: page inference — 3–5-year hardware life applied to the 2024–25 purchase wave. Debt rollover 2028–30: page inference — typical tenors on the 2025–26 issuance the BIS documents (Graphs 11.A, 13.A); the BIS documents the issuance, not the maturity wall. Constructions labelled as inference. |
| Required slope ≈ +40%/yr in the watch-list | Page derivation: identifiable AI-revenue run-rate entering 2026 ≈ $250B/yr (order of magnitude across disclosed run-rates and lab revenues); floor $1.3T by end-2030 ⇒ (1300/250)^(1/5) − 1 ≈ 39%/yr. Order-of-magnitude, hence "~40%". |
| Required slope is a band, not a line (audit note, 2026-07-31) | The 40% inherits the base estimate's uncertainty: a $200B base ⇒ 45%/yr, $300B ⇒ 34%/yr. Sparkline verdicts within a few points of the line (Azure +43 "clears", AWS +37 "below") are judgment calls inside a ≈35–45% band; the colors mark the point estimate, this row records the band. |
| Gap chart: required ramp | §2 floor × the share of the BIS 2025–30 committed-capex window in place at each date. Anchors (share of the $3.5T default): end-2025 ≈ 13% (2025 spend ≈ $0.45T — the BIS's >$1T for 2025–26 minus ≈$0.84T of 2026 guides); end-2026 ≈ 36%; linear build to 100% at end-2030. **Fixed 2026-07-30**: the ramp previously accumulated from 2024 inside the window — the BIS window opens in 2025; prior-year spend is excluded, matching Graph 11.B's definition. |
| Gap chart: five-way split | Announced 2026 capex: Microsoft $190B (Apr 2026 call), Amazon $220B (raised from $200B on the 30 Jul Q2 call), Alphabet $195–205B (mid $200B), Meta $130–145B (mid $137.5B), Oracle $90–95B FY27 gross guide (mid $92.5B — Oracle gives no CY2026 figure; the FY27 guide is the nearest announced annual number). Total $840B. Amazon's raise also moves the ramp's end-2026 anchor from 0.363 to 0.369 of the $3.5T window — immaterial at the ledger's stated precision, so the 0.36 anchor is kept. **Fixed 2026-08-27**: the raise moved the data, this row and the registry on 30 July, but not the two places that restate the total in prose — the page's split-shares comment ("AMZN 200 ... = $820B") and the ramp-anchor row above ("≈$0.82T of 2026 guides"). Both now read $840B / $0.84T. `check-derivations.py` gained a check on the split-shares comment, mirroring the CY2023-baseline one: the `share:` fields were always guarded, the sentence documenting them was not, and on a page whose ethos is inspectability a stale comment is a wrong number. |
| Gap chart: actuals | Trailing-twelve-month reported total revenue minus each company's calendar-2023 total (Oracle on fiscal quarters ending Feb/May/Aug/Nov). 2023 baseline = the BIS's AI-boom trough (Graph 11.C notes). Quarterly revenue via stockanalysis.com, cross-checked against captured prints (Microsoft Q2'26 $90.0B ✓, Meta Q2'26 $60.8B ✓, Amazon Q2'26 $200.6B ✓ — SEC 8-K, 30 Jul, captured by the geoveu pipeline; Amazon TTM 775.7 − baseline 574.8 = +200.9). CY2023 baselines ($B): Microsoft 227.6, Alphabet 307.4, Amazon 574.8, Meta 134.9, Oracle 51.6. Deliberately over-credits AI (all growth counts); stated on the page. **Oracle point appended 2026-09-10** for its FY27 Q1 (quarter ended 31 Aug, mapped to calendar Q3 2026): TTM revenue = FY26 total 67,357 - Q1 FY26 14,926 + Q1 FY27 19,345 = **$71,776M**, minus the 51.6 baseline = **+$20.2B/yr**. Both comparatives from the 10 June 2026 release, the current quarter from the 10 Sept 2026 release. This makes the series **ragged by construction**, and that is now a documented rule rather than an accident: Oracle's offset fiscal quarters land its August reading a month before the other four report calendar Q3, so `GAP.x` carries the longest series while `drawGap()` holds the aggregate at `aggN` = the shortest `v` array. Appending a company past that point therefore moves its own line only. The aggregate actual line and the 'reading as of' note did **not** move on this print, and the page says the reading is as of the last quarter all five have reported. |
| Gap chart: trend-adjusted toggle (added 2026-07-31) | Second crediting mode: expected TTM(t) = CY2023 base × (1+g)^(t−2024), residual = actual − expected, with g = each company's CY2022→CY2023 revenue growth. CY2022 totals ($B): Microsoft 204.0 (Mar/Jun 2022 quarters via stockanalysis.com; Sep 2022 $50.1B and Dec 2022 $52.7B from Microsoft's own FY23 Q1/Q2 releases), Alphabet 282.8, Amazon 514.0, Meta 116.6, Oracle 46.1 (offset fiscal quarters). Growth rates: 11.5% / 8.7% / 11.8% / 15.7% / 12.1%. Conservative for the AI residual by construction: Meta's 15.7% is a rebound from its 2022 revenue decline, and Oracle's 12.1% includes the Cerner acquisition's first full year — inflated trends shrink the residual. At Q2 2026 the aggregate residual is ≈ +$149B/yr versus ≈ +$553B/yr on ceiling crediting; the two readings bracket the unobservable true AI figure, and the page says so. |
| Oracle row in the watch-list | Oracle Q4 FY2026 press release, 10 Jun 2026 (investor.oracle.com): total revenue $19.2B +21% yoy; OCI (IaaS) +93% to $5.8B; RPO $638B, +$85B in the quarter; FY26 revenue $67.4B +17%; FY26 capex $55.7B (exceeding free cash flow); FY27 gross capex guide $90–95B; shares −10% on the print. Added 2026-07-30 — the BIS's fifth hyperscaler had been missing from the watch-list. Sparkline slope uses OCI +93% vs the +40% required slope. **Companion page added 2026-08-27** (`oracle.html`), the last BIS-five member to get one, written from `tools/companion-template.html`. Figures re-confirmed against the release itself, Oracle being outside geoveu's capture: FY26 operating cash flow $31,977M, capital expenditures $55,663M, free cash flow −$23,686M, all from the release's trailing-four-quarter table. That table also independently confirms this page's Oracle strain series — TTM capex ÷ operating cash flow runs 41%, 53%, 72%, 102%, 127%, 159%, **205%**, 174% across the eight quarters to May 2026, matching the chart's peak-above-200-then-ease-to-174 shape; and the implied Q4 step (TTM Q4 55,663 − TTM Q3 48,250 = 7,413) matches the chart's own 16.5 − 9.1 = 7.4. **Corrected 2026-08-27**: the row previously said "shares −10% on the spend". Sources disagree on magnitude and sampling — TradingKey records more than 7% down after hours recovering to −4.85% at $191.49, Sherwood 5%, others "as much as 10%", and the following morning's session −12.6% — so the row and the page now state the range (−7% after hours, −12.6% next morning) rather than a single unsupported figure. FY27 gross capex guide $90–95B and ≈$70B net are **call figures, not in the release**, labelled as such on the page; note the gross guide sits at or above the $90B FY27 revenue guide the release confirms. **Refreshed 2026-09-10 for Oracle FY2027 Q1** (quarter ended 31 Aug), the row rewritten and moved to the top of the table; the 10 June figures above are retained as the prior reading. All figures from Exhibit 99.1 to the 8-K filed 10 Sept 2026 (SEC EDGAR accession 0001193125-26-387905), Oracle being outside geoveu's capture: total revenue $19,345M +30% (prior-year quarter $14,926M); total cloud $11.6B +62%, inside Oracle's own +58-64% guide; OCI (IaaS) $7.4B **+121%**, against +93% the prior quarter — the sparkline slope figure; cloud applications $4.2B +10%; software $5,550M -3%; RPO **$664B**, +$209B year on year and +$26B on the $638B of the prior quarter, on more than $30B of new AI cloud contracts; GAAP EPS $1.56 +55%, non-GAAP EPS $1.92 +30% against a ~$1.74 street; operating cash flow $23,103M +184%; capital expenditures $28,499M; free cash flow **-$5,396M** (stated on the page as -$5.4B); net cash outlay for capital expenditures $17,966M after subtracting $11,363M of customer prepayments and adding back $830M of short-term financing; a completed $20B at-the-market equity sale; 850MW of data-centre capacity and over 300,000 GPUs delivered since the May quarter; FY27 revenue guide raised to at least $90B with non-GAAP EPS $8.10, Q2 revenue growth guided 30-34%. The FY27 gross capex guide of $90-95B is **unchanged**, so the gap chart's $92.5B Oracle share and the $840B split total do not move. *Page construction* in the row: capex-to-revenue for the quarter, 28,499 / 19,345 = **$1.47** per dollar of revenue, up from $0.86 in the May quarter. **Press-reported, not filed**: the share move. Sources disagree — StockTitan records +4.13% after hours at $159.26 after a session close of $152.94 that was itself down 5.38%, other reports run to +7% — so the row states the session fall and an approximate after-hours recovery rather than a single figure, the same treatment the June print received. |
| Non-BIS rows carry a not-in-model note | Policy (2026-07-30): watch-list rows outside the BIS's five hyperscalers say so inline — Nvidia (the supplier the five's capex flows to), Apple (the control group, added 31 Jul at the owner's request), Anthropic and OpenAI (labs, tracked as pure-play revenue evidence, not capex), SpaceX (added 7 Aug — a sixth builder, tracked as the outer bound of the capex-to-revenue gauge). The US-jobs row is macro, not a company. Non-BIS rows get no slope sparkline and feed no gap-chart slice. SpaceX's AI revenue grew +247% yoy, which would clear the required slope several times over; it is stated in the row's caption text and deliberately not drawn, because a sparkline against the +40% line would imply membership of a model it is not in. |
| Apple row in the watch-list | Apple Q3 FY2026 press release, 30 Jul 2026: revenue $109.4B +16% (record June quarter); quarterly capex $3.4B / ≈$11B annualized (PrimeXBT preview comparison, cited on apple.html); shares −8% after hours on soft September-quarter guidance (CNBC live coverage). Control-group framing per the apple.html analysis; no sparkline — Apple makes no AI-capex bet, so there is no required slope for it to clear. |
| Amazon row in the watch-list | geoveu capture of the 30 Jul 2026 SEC 8-K: revenue $200.6B +20% yoy (guide $194–199B); operating income $27.5B (guide $20–24B); AWS +37% yoy at a $169B annualized run rate, fastest in 18 quarters; AWS backlog $496B and the 2026 capex raise to $220B from the call (CNBC earnings coverage, 30 Jul); net income $62.6B including a $53.4B non-operating gain, primarily the Anthropic stake. Sparkline uses AWS +37% vs the +40% required slope. Full-page analyses (amazon.html, apple.html) carry their own source lists in their footers. |
| Nvidia row in the watch-list (reported 2026-08-26) | Not one of the BIS's five (it is the supplier); kept as the capex-side thermometer, labelled as such on the row. Q2 FY2027 figures from the 8-K filed 26 Aug 2026 (SEC EDGAR, EX-99.1 `q2fy27pr.htm`, accession 0001045810-26-000073): revenue **$96,221M**, +18% q/q and +106% y/y; Data Center revenue **$89.0B**, +18% q/q and +117% y/y; GAAP gross margin 75.0%; GAAP diluted EPS **$2.46**, non-GAAP **$2.22**; ~$26.0B returned to shareholders in the quarter, ~$99.0B remaining under the repurchase authorisation; Q3 FY2027 outlook **$108.0B ±2%**, explicitly assuming no Data Center compute revenue from China; announced financing partnerships with Apollo, BlackRock, Blackstone, Brookfield, Goldman Sachs and KKR to mobilise over $500B of third-party capital, stated in the release as subject to definitive agreements. Beat comparators: its own Q1 guide of **$91.0B ±2%** (Q1 FY2027 release, 20 May 2026) and a street consensus of ≈$91.9B revenue / ≈$2.08 diluted EPS (the consensus figure is the geoveu capture's, not a filing figure, and is load-bearing for nothing). Sequential base stated in the row from 2026-08-27: Q1 FY2027 revenue **$81.6B** (+20% q/q, +85% y/y) and Data Center revenue **$75.2B** (+21% q/q, +92% y/y), from the Q1 FY2027 release of 20 May 2026 — the prior quarter's actuals, shown so the +18% q/q step has a visible base rather than only a percentage. The Q2 release rounds Data Center growth to +18% q/q, which against $75.2B implies $88.7B; the row uses the release's own **$89.0B**, not the back-computed figure. **Correction folded in with this print:** the pre-print row described the $91B figure as a data-centre guide — it was the guide for total revenue. Non-BIS row, so no slope sparkline, no gap-chart slice and no contribution to the capex total or required ramp, per the standing policy row above; the pre-print placeholder's promise to draw a slope after the print predated that policy (commit 229711d, before 2026-07-30) and is retired rather than honoured. Nvidia's revenue is the five's capital spending seen from the supplier's side of the invoice, so it enters neither the strain chart nor the gap chart, which would double-count the same dollars. |
| nvidia.html analysis page (added 2026-08-27) | **Page construction** on the companion page, every input from the Q2 FY2027 earnings release (SEC 8-K exhibit 99.1, filed 26 Aug 2026 — income statement, balance sheet and cash-flow statement). Cash conversion: operating cash flow ÷ net income = 24,077 ÷ 59,688 = **40.3%**, against 15,365 ÷ 26,422 = **58.2%** a year earlier. Receivables build ÷ revenue = 22,346 ÷ 96,221 = **23.2%**. Days sales outstanding = AR ÷ quarterly revenue × 91 days (a 13-week fiscal quarter): 63,059 ÷ 96,221 × 91 = **≈59.6 days**, against 38,466 ÷ 68,100 × 91 = **≈51.4 days** at FY2026 year-end (Q4 FY2026 revenue $68.1B per the Q1 FY2027 release). Equity gains ÷ net income = 7,771 ÷ 59,688 = **13.0%** for the quarter and 23,707 ÷ 118,010 = **20.1%** for the half-year. Equity stakes held = marketable equity securities + non-marketable securities = 42,783 + 51,157 = **$93,940M**, against 12,886 + 22,251 = **$35,137M** at FY2026 year-end, an increase of **$58,803M** in six months. H1 equity purchases ÷ H1 own capex = 42,404 ÷ 4,434 = **≈9.6×**. H1 equity purchases ÷ H1 revenue = 42,404 ÷ (96,221 + 81,615 = 177,836) = **≈23.8%**, the page’s "roughly 24 cents per dollar of revenue". Capex ÷ revenue on BIS Graph 11.A's gauge = 2,677 ÷ 96,221 = **≈0.028×**, the lowest on the watch list by an order of magnitude and the reason the supplier's own spending is immaterial to the model. Long-term debt 7,469 → 32,366 over the half-year, with $24,896M raised in Q2; buybacks $19,732M and dividends $6,047M in Q2 (summing to the release's stated ≈$26.0B returned). Q3 guide step-up = 108,000 ÷ 96,221 − 1 = **+12.2% q/q**; Data Center share of revenue = 89,000 ÷ 96,221 = **92.5%**. Non-filing items, attributed on the page and load-bearing for nothing: the after-hours share move (down ≈0.5% on the release, then up ≈5% to record highs during the call), the "extreme pricing conditions in memory" remark, the fiscal-2028 comment and the **cloud-industry** backlog figure of >$2 trillion — all from Yahoo Finance's coverage of the call, not from the release. The backlog is the cloud industry's as reported, **not** Nvidia's own; an earlier secondary summary described it as Nvidia's backlog and was not used. A hyperscaler-capex forecast (≈$800B for 2026, ≈$1.3T for 2027) was also attributed to the call by secondary sources but could not be verified against a readable transcript, so it is **deliberately absent** from the page. Per the roster rule, none of this enters the constants registry, the gap chart, the strain chart or the capex total: Nvidia's revenue is the five's capital spending seen from the supplier's side of the invoice. |
| SpaceX row in the watch-list (added 2026-08-07) | SpaceX Q2 2026 earnings release, 4 Aug 2026 (SEC EX-99.1): revenue **$7,814M**, +92% yoy; segments Space $962M / Connectivity $4,291M / AI $2,561M; AI capex **$15,828M** against total capex **$18,369M**; H1 capex **$28,476M** and H1 net cash from operating activities **$3,466M**; net loss $541M; Adjusted EBITDA $3,538M; nameplate compute 1.4 GW; $14.1B of contracted cloud sales; IPO closed 15 Jun 2026 with ≈**$85.7B** net proceeds (Nasdaq: SPCX, trading from 12 Jun), plus a **$25B** bond issue on 26 Jun in five tranches maturing 2031–2056 at a weighted-average **5.855%**; cash and marketable securities $100B. Share reaction −8% after hours to ≈$125 against the $135 offer price: TechCrunch, 4 Aug 2026 (not in the release). Non-BIS row, so no slope sparkline and no gap-chart slice, per the standing policy row below. Page arithmetic in the row: capex ÷ revenue 18,369 ÷ 7,814 = **2.35×**; AI capex ÷ AI revenue 15,828 ÷ 2,561 = **6.18×**; AI revenue annualised 2,561 × 4 = **≈$10.2B/yr**. |
| §2 floor arithmetic applied to SpaceX's quarter (added 2026-08-07) | **Page construction** — the §2 floor run on one company's single quarter at the page's own defaults (5-year hardware life, 10% required return), with the $250B fixed-opex term omitted because it is a sector-level figure, so the result is a floor on the floor. Q2 AI capex $15.828B ⇒ 15.828/5 + 0.10 × 15.828 = 3.166 + 1.583 = **≈$4.75B/yr** of permanent bill from one quarter's spending; four such quarters = **≈$19.0B/yr** against an AI revenue run-rate of ≈$10.2B/yr. (H1's $23.551B on the same formula ⇒ ≈$7.07B/yr.) The same known limitation applies as in §2: the bill is static and linear, while the system that must pay it is financed. |
| spacex.html capex-to-revenue bar chart (added 2026-08-07) | **Page construction** on the companion page, same gauge as BIS Graph 11.A applied per company to the June 2026 quarter, each from its own release: Amazon 54.2/200.6 = **0.27×**, Alphabet 44.9/119.8 = **0.37×**, Microsoft 35.8/90.0 = **0.40×**, Meta 30.1/60.8 = **0.50×**, Oracle 16.5/19.2 = **0.86×** (offset fiscal quarter ending May; Oracle's *next* quarter, reported 10 Sept, reached 28,499/19,345 = **1.47×**, and the §1 note and the SpaceX watch-list row were dated on 2026-09-10 so the 0.86 is no longer read as current — the chart itself stays pinned to the June quarter, which is what makes it like-for-like with SpaceX's), SpaceX 18,369/7,814 = **2.35×**, SpaceX AI segment 15,828/2,561 = **6.18×** (drawn truncated — the bar would need 2.6× the chart's width; the label carries the figure). Numerators are the quarterly capex figures already anchored in the strain-chart row above; cash capex, finance leases excluded. Companion-page target-slope arithmetic, same status: $1T by end-2030 from ≈$31.3B/yr (Q2 × 4) over 4.5 years ⇒ (1000/31.3)^(1/4.5) − 1 ≈ **116%/yr**; the page states ≈138%/yr over four years (end-2026 → end-2030), the stricter and more natural reading of "reaching $1T in 2030". Both readings dwarf the sector's ~40% required slope, which is the only claim the page hangs on them. |
| spacex.html "Should the model's bill go up?" (added 2026-08-07) | **Page construction** answering the double-counting question explicitly. Capex side: not double-counted — compute rented from SpaceX sits in the renter's operating costs, not its capex line, so SpaceX's machines are in none of the five's capex totals. Model side: the §2 slider is anchored to BIS Graph 11.B's *sector-wide* cumulative axis ($2–4.5T committed 2025–30), and the five's $840B splits the bill (gap-chart band) rather than setting it — so a sixth builder's spend argues the slider toward the top of its range instead of adding a slice on top, which would double-count against the sector-wide anchor. Arithmetic: AI-segment capex annualised 15.828 × 4 ≈ $63B/yr; sustained mid-2026 → end-2030 (≈4.5 yrs) ≈ **$0.3T**; slider $3.5T → $3.8T moves the floor by 0.3/5 + 0.10 × 0.3 = **≈$90B/yr** at the §2 defaults. Revenue side: would double-count — intra-boom payments net to zero on consolidation; the floor must be paid from outside the build-out. This is the ledger's §1 scope-note and §3 third-strip reasoning, stated on the page where the reader will actually ask it. |
| Strain-chart SpaceX marker (added 2026-08-07) | **Named deviation from the chart's own construction**, stated in the label and the panel note. Every plotted line is trailing-twelve-month; SpaceX has only two quarters of public accounts, so its ratio is half-year: 28,476 ÷ 3,466 = **≈820%**, H1 2026 capex ÷ H1 2026 operating cash flow. Drawn as a top-edge flag rather than a sixth line for two reasons — it is not one of the BIS's five, and plotting 820% on a 220% axis would compress the five into the baseline. Comparator on the chart: Oracle at ≈174% TTM. |
| Strain chart (added 2026-07-31) | TTM capital expenditure ÷ TTM operating cash flow per company, quarterly raw series Q1 2024–Q2 2026 from the quarterly cash-flow statements via stockanalysis.com (Oracle on offset fiscal quarters). Anchors cross-checked: Oracle's four FY26 quarters sum to its reported $55.7B capex; Microsoft's Sep/Dec 2024 quarters re-verified after a table misread (OCF $34.2B/$22.3B, capex $14.9B/$15.8B); Meta's Q2 2026 (capex $30.1B cash vs $31.1B incl. finance leases in its release) and Microsoft's Q2 2026 ($35.8B cash vs $41B incl. leases) consistent net of leases; Alphabet/Amazon 2024 quarters match reported figures. Cash capex only — finance leases excluded, understating strain (the conservative direction). **Named deviation from BIS Graph 11.A**: the BIS divides capex by revenue (intensity); this chart divides by operating cash flow (funding capacity) — stated on the page. TTM ratios computed in code from the raw quarters, so print updates append raw data only. **Oracle quarter appended 2026-09-10** (FY27 Q1, ended 31 Aug, mapped to calendar Q3 2026): capex $28,499M → 28.5, operating cash flow $23,103M → 23.1, both from the 10 Sept release's condensed cash-flow statement. New TTM: capex 12.0 + 18.6 + 16.5 + 28.5 = 75.6; operating cash flow 2.1 + 7.2 + 14.6 + 23.1 = 47.0; ratio **161%**, down from 174%. *Page construction, annotated on the page because the fall is an artefact*: $11,363M of that operating cash flow is customer prepayments for capacity not yet built, and the prior quarter carried $4,592M of the same. Oracle subtracts both in its own 'net cash outlay for capital expenditures' table. Stripping them from the denominator gives 75,660 / (46,940 - 11,363 - 4,592) = 75,660 / 30,985 = **244%**, the figure the chart's construction note and oracle.html both carry. The chart plots the unadjusted statement figures, so the note says to read the fall as funding arriving early rather than strain easing. Two geometry changes in the same commit, both forced by the ragged series: the x-domain was extended from 2026.5 to 2026.75 with a 'Q3 2026' tick, and the per-company end labels now anchor to each company's own last point instead of a shared right edge — which was only ever correct while every series ended together. |
| Jobs row: the divergence test | Page derivation (§4 arithmetic inverted, added 2026-07-30; payroll figures refreshed 2026-09-04 with the August print). If the gap chart's aggregate actual (+$553B/yr at Q2 2026, all five reported) were wage-pool revenue: 553 ÷ 25% capture = ≈$2.21T displaced wages/yr; ÷ $80k = ≈28M jobs-equivalent — visibly absent from payrolls (August: **+162k**, u 4.1%, average hourly earnings +3.1% yoy, prior-12-month average gain +31k; per the BLS Employment Situation release USDL-26-1435 of 4 Sept 2026 and the geoveu pipeline's capture of the same morning, which agree), so today's revenue is tools + circular financing, not substitution. The same release revised July from −23k to **+21k** and June from +20k to +31k; the row therefore no longer carries a contraction, and says so, because its 7 Aug reading (payrolls falling with the unemployment rate, read as labour-force shrinkage) rested on a first estimate. The page claims nothing about the white-collar split, which neither the release's captured components nor the row carries; the 8k loss in computing infrastructure, data processing and web hosting is reported as the BLS states it, unattributed. The 2027–28 boundary is where the required ramp exceeds plausible IT-budget supply (software pool ≈$1.2T/yr total, §3): past it, on-schedule revenue and flat payrolls are mutually exclusive. Figures update with the gap chart; the jobs row's dollar figures should be refreshed whenever the aggregate moves materially (a jobs print itself changes no GAP or STRAIN data). Scope caveat (added 2026-09-04): the row watches one country while the BIS's framing, and §6's $24T→$48T, is across the advanced economies; the page reads US payrolls as the leading indicator rather than the whole test because the capex, the AI-exposed sectors and the BIS's own early evidence of labour-market adjustment (AI-exposed US sectors showing higher productivity gains partly at the expense of employment growth, Graph 10.C, p. 21) are US. That ordering is the page's reasoning, not a BIS claim. |
| US labour-share row in the watch-list (added 2026-09-03) | **Directly sourced, and evidence beside the model** — no slope, no gap-chart slice, no contribution to any total. BLS Productivity and Costs, *Second Quarter 2026, Revised*, released 3 Sept 2026 (USDL 26-1434): labour share **52.8%**, stated by BLS as "the lowest level in the series, which begins in the first quarter of 1947"; labour productivity +1.4%, output +1.7%, hours +0.3%, unit labour costs +1.2%, hourly compensation +2.6%, real hourly compensation **−3.3%**. The 6 Aug preliminary (USDL 26-1290) read labour share 52.9%, unit labour costs +1.3%, hourly compensation +2.7% — both prints are recorded because the revision moved every one of those figures. Confirmed twice per the figures rule: geoveu captures the series from 3 Sept 2026 (`us-productivity-q2-2026-revised`, parser guards quarter, vintage and release-dateline) and the BLS release page itself. **Sector, which is load-bearing:** nonfarm business — excludes general government, nonprofits and households — so this is NOT a whole-economy labour share and is not comparable like-for-like with the AMECO row below or with §4/§6's intercept. |
| Whole-economy labour-share row in the watch-list (added 2026-09-03) | **Directly sourced, and evidence beside the model.** European Commission AMECO, series `ALCD0` "Adjusted wage share: total economy", percentage of GDP, spring 2026 vintage, read via DBnomics 2026-09-03. Adjusted = employee-equivalent compensation imputed to each self-employed person, which is what makes it whole-economy comparable. 2024 actuals: euro area (EA20) **56.34%**, EU27 **55.70%**, US **54.49%**, Germany **59.09%**. Commission forecasts for 2026: 56.98 / 56.24 / **53.56** / 60.31 — labelled as forecasts on the page, because 2025–27 in this vintage are projections. The direction split the row rests on: EA20 55.39 (2022) → 56.98 (2026f) rising, US 54.89 (2022) → 53.56 (2026f) falling. Refresh with new AMECO vintages (spring and autumn forecast rounds), not per print — same policy as the §6 reality-check chart's IMF WEO series. |

| meta.html after-hours move — **corrected 2026-08-27, and again on its share card 2026-09-11** | The companion page reported Meta's Q2 print as "shares −5% after hours" in three places and "$556 after hours", and carried alphabet.html's Sources block verbatim — citing Alphabet's 22 Jul release as the source for Meta's 29 Jul figures. Both were copy-paste from alphabet.html, which the page's own line "the Alphabet reaction, repeated" makes legible. The watch-list row on index.html was right throughout at −9.6%. Corrected against source: close $585.61, after-hours $529.15, **−9.64%**, and the Sources block replaced with Meta's own (results release, call transcript, Fortune, TradingKey). The geoveu pipeline no longer holds the July Meta record — its capture rotates — so this was verified from the public record instead. **Standing rule from this print (2026-08-27):** every figure now needs two independent confirmations before it ships, geoveu's record being only one of them, with the primary filing settling any disagreement; and a new companion page starts from `tools/companion-template.html` with a blank sources block rather than from a sibling page. `scripts/check-pages.py` enforces the second mechanically — it fails the deploy on an unfilled placeholder, on a sources block that never names its own company, or on two pages sharing one. Verified against this very bug: restoring alphabet.html's block onto meta.html trips both the naming and the duplicate check. The page's data table was correct throughout: revenue $60.8B, EPS $6.18, FCF $0.8B (reported $784M), capex $31.1B gross against the $30.1B cash figure the strain chart uses net of finance leases. **A fourth instance, found 2026-09-11.** The correction reached the page's three occurrences but not its share card — the picture a chat app shows when the link is posted — which went on reading "shares −5% on a beat" for two more weeks. Nothing could see it: the card's words existed only inside a PNG, and no check in this repo reads pixels. The card now says −9.6%, matching the page's own clock, and the words of every card live as text in the manifest in `tools/make-og-card.py`, which `scripts/check-pages.py` re-renders and compares byte for byte on every deploy. The generator was verified against the seven cards already shipped before it was trusted: each regenerated identically from its recorded text, so the manifest records what those cards actually said rather than a later paraphrase. |

## §8 · Reading beside the model

This section carries no page constants and feeds no model. Every figure in it
is an **attributed third-party claim**, reproduced as the cited author's own
and load-bearing for nothing on this page.

**Moved 2026-08-27, and the section retired 2026-09-03.** The entries live on
their own page (`reading.html`), newest first. Between those dates the main
page kept a §8 summary table of headlines with a one-line statement of what
each tests (the annotation label changed from "where it presses" to "what it
tests" on 2026-08-28 — plainer, per the owner); that section is now gone, and
the reading page is reached from the site nav in the main page's header
instead. This section number is therefore retired rather than reused: the
essay runs §1–§7. The classification below is unchanged by either move: still
attributed third-party claims, still feeding nothing.


- US Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Productivity and Costs, Second Quarter 2026,
  Revised* (USDL 26-1434, released 3 September 2026), flagged by Mike Konczal on
  Bluesky the same day. Quoted claims, all the BLS's: nonfarm-business labour
  share **52.8%** in Q2 2026, "the lowest level in the series, which begins in
  the first quarter of 1947"; real hourly compensation −3.3% in the quarter and
  −0.1% over four quarters; unit profits of nonfinancial corporations +43.0%
  annualised in the quarter (fastest since Q2 2021) and +17.8% over four
  quarters (fastest since Q4 2021); labour productivity +1.4% in the quarter,
  +2.2% year on year, and a 2.1% annualised rate since Q4 2019 against 1.5% in
  the previous business cycle and 2.1% long-run since 1947. None enters the
  constants registry. Confirmed twice per the standing rule: the BLS release
  read at source, and the BLS public API series **PRS85006173** (nonfarm
  business labour share index, 2017 = 100), which is an independent retrieval
  of the same revised data. Konczal's post is the flag, not a confirmation.

  **Page construction — the quarterly path.** The release publishes the level
  as a percentage but the retrievable series is an index, so the two are joined
  by a single scale factor: 52.8 ÷ 93.446 (the Q2 2026 index) = 0.56502, applied
  to each quarter's index. Readings used on the reading page: Q4 2022 = 96.900 →
  54.75%, Q4 2024 = 96.940 → 54.77%, Q2 2026 = 93.446 → 52.80%. Hence "still for
  the two years to the end of 2024" (+0.02 pt) and "about two points since"
  (−1.97 pt over six quarters, ≈1.3 pt/yr). The rescaled figures inherit the
  rounding of the published 52.8%, so they are stated to one decimal and never
  finer. This arithmetic feeds nothing above; it exists to size the claim that
  the fall is a post-2024 development.

  **The annotation is a reading of this page's own §6, not a BLS claim.** The
  §6 dial takes its boundary condition from the BIS: in the no-substitution
  scenarios labour's share does not move at any growth rate, and the dial only
  turns once the bet pays off. A labour share falling while §4 still reads
  today's revenue as tools and circular financing is evidence *against* that
  premise, and is explicitly **not** filed as evidence the bet is working.
  Nothing in the release attributes any part of the fall to AI.

  **Corrected 2026-09-03, after publication (owner's objection).** The entry first
  said the fall showed the share "moving for reasons that have nothing to do
  with an AI substitution shock". That is too strong: it treats "not
  substitution" as "not AI", and so erases the bargaining channel — AI lowering
  labour's share through the credible *threat* of replacement, which shifts the
  employer's outside option in wage-setting without anyone being displaced. The
  entry now names three non-exclusive channels (not AI at all; substitution
  already happening; the bargaining/anticipation channel) and states that this
  release separates none of them.

  The bargaining channel is the one that matters for the dial, and it makes the
  objection stronger rather than weaker. The page had been treating displacement
  in the payroll data as the signal that starts the clock; on this channel the
  transfer begins with the threat and never shows up in payrolls, so §4's "no
  displacement visible" is not evidence that the share is safe. §6 already
  argues the reverse leg — that a shrinking share drains labour's leverage — so
  the two form a loop, not a sequence. Recorded here because it changes what the
  page is watching for, not because any figure moved: no constant changed.

  **No constant moved, and none should.** The 60% labour share in §4 and §6 is
  the BIS's advanced-economy figure for whole economies. The 52.8% is the US
  nonfarm business sector, which excludes government, households, non-profits
  and farms and has always printed materially lower. Different scope, different
  geography; neither updates the other.

- Mike Konczal, two posts on Bluesky (a thread — the second is his own reply
  to the first), 3 September 2026. Reported claim: that the record-low labour
  share is "a big deal, and a new post-2024 development". The 52.8% itself is
  **not** an attributed claim — it is BLS's own published figure and is
  confirmed against the release (USDL 26-1434) and geoveu's capture, which is
  why it also appears as a sourced §7 row. What stays attributed to Konczal is
  the *break* reading: that the level dates from 2024 rather than continuing a
  decline tracked since the 1980s. The page states where that reading is
  harder to hold — on the comparable whole-economy measure the euro area's
  labour share has been rising since 2022 while the US falls, so on present
  evidence the move is a US development rather than a developed-world one.
  Neither post claims AI as the cause and the page does not supply one. None
  enters the constants registry.

- Adam Posen, interviewed on Bloomberg's *Odd Lots*, "Adam Posen Thinks
  Things Could Get Very 'Messy' for the Fed", 1 September 2026. Reported
  claims: that there is more indicative evidence of AI in productivity than in
  the labour market; that hiring continues to grow in long-haul trucking and
  junior coding; that Brynjolfsson's J-curve and Garicano's "messy jobs"
  explain the absence of displacement so far; that any AI productivity boost to
  growth registered only in the last year and a half; and that reduced hiring
  of younger workers cannot be attributed to AI alone given the post-Covid
  reshuffling. None enters the constants registry.

  **Sourcing deviation, stated on the page.** Bloomberg's own transcript is
  behind bot protection, so Posen's remarks were read from a third-party
  automatic transcript (podscripts.co), which misspells several of the names it
  reports — Brynjolfsson, Garicano, Korinek, Kolko, Ozimek and Chorzempa all
  appear mangled. One automatic transcript does not meet the two-confirmation
  rule, so the entry **paraphrases throughout and presents nothing as a
  verbatim quote**, and both substantive claims are cited to their own primary
  sources instead:

  - The messy-jobs argument: Luis Garicano, Jin Li and Yanhui Wu, *Messy Jobs:
    The Work That AI Cannot Reach* (June 2026), messyjobs.ai — confirmed twice,
    the publisher's site and the HKU Centre for AI, Management and Organization
    launch record, which agree on authors and framing.
  - The 0.3% GDP claim, **traced before write-up and found to be misattributed
    in the interview itself**: it is neither Posen's nor the Peterson
    Institute's (Posen name-checks PIIE colleagues as working the topic) but
    Isabel Juniewicz, Daniel Carey, Phil Trammell and Anson Ho, "The
    Nvidia-sized hole in US GDP statistics", Epoch AI, 24 August 2026, read at
    source. Its actual claim is narrower than the interview's shorthand: US GDP
    **growth** understated by about 0.3 percentage points over the past year
    (not the GDP level), from a gap averaging ~$30B/quarter attributable to
    Nvidia through 2025, projected toward ~2 percentage points of growth by end
    2028 on current trends; Epoch states it confirmed the absence with the BEA.
    The mechanism is the fabless case: chips designed in the US but
    manufactured and sold abroad generate no recorded goods export and no
    recorded IP export.

  The entry's annotation is a reading of this page's own sections, not a claim
  by Posen or by Epoch: the measurement gap is routed to the §6 growth dial
  rather than to the bill or the gap chart, because Nvidia's value-add already
  appears on this page as the five's capex seen from the supplier's side, and
  the gap chart is built from the five's reported revenue, which national-
  accounts convention does not alter.

- Heather Hennerich, "How Does Productivity Affect Inflation, Jobs and Pay?",
  Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, *Open Vault*, 26 August 2026, interviewing
  St. Louis Fed senior economic policy advisor Alex Bick. Quoted claims: that a
  10 percentage point rise in AI adoption among an industry's workers went with
  2.9 percentage points of additional cumulative labour productivity growth (US
  Q4 2022 – Q3 2025; Europe 2022–24), with no clear industry-level employment
  effect in either direction; that wage increases typically reflect
  productivity and inflation; Governor Christopher Waller's claim that
  sustained productivity growth above 2% supports rising real incomes without
  inflation pressure; and farming's fall from about 41% of US workers in 1900
  to under 2% today. All are the interview's and its sources', not this page's,
  and none enters the constants registry. Confirmed twice per the standing
  rule: the Open Vault piece itself, and the underlying research post it cites
  — Bick, Blandin, Deming, Fuchs-Schündeln and Jessen, "Mind the Gap: AI
  Adoption in Europe and the U.S." (St. Louis Fed *On the Economy*, 30 March
  2026, from a paper prepared for the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
  Spring 2026) — which states the 10pp/2.9pp figure identically and adds the
  authors' own caveat that the estimates are not causal. The entry's annotation
  is a reading of the page's own §3 and §4, not a claim by the authors: the
  Fed's mechanism has the productivity gain passing to buyers and workers,
  which is the opposite direction from the §4 capture rate.

  **Corrected 2026-09-03, same day as publication.** The entry originally
  called the 10pp/2.9pp result "a small number next to a bill that needs about
  40% revenue growth a year". That comparison was wrong on two counts: it set a
  cumulative figure against an annual one without converting (2.9pp over the
  eleven quarters to Q3 2025 is ≈1pp/yr), and it compared an industry-level
  productivity measure against five companies' required revenue growth, which
  share no denominator. The corrected entry states the conversion and drops the
  comparison, keeping the point that does hold: the study does not measure
  capture, which is what the bet turns on. No figure and no constant changed —
  the error was in the comparison, not the number — and nothing in the model
  could have caught it, since neither quantity is a page constant.

- Adam Shaw, "Bringing robotics to life", FT *Free Lunch*, 23 August 2026.
  Quoted claims: that investors have few incentives to automate business
  functions where labour costs are low; and a 2026 study led by Erik
  Brynjolfsson reporting a 10% higher statutory pay floor correlated with 8%
  higher robot adoption in factories. Both are the article's, not this page's,
  and neither enters the constants registry. The robot-adoption figure traces
  to a public primary source — Brynjolfsson, Li, Miranda, Seamans and Wang,
  "Minimum Wages and the Rise of the Robots", Stanford Digital Economy Lab —
  which the entry links directly, since the newsletter edition itself was
  published email-first and has no public article URL.

- Kristalina Georgieva, IMF, remarks of 25 August 2026. Quoted figures: global
  growth 3% for 2026 (from 3.1% in April), 3.4% for 2027, Middle East cut 1.2
  percentage points to 0.7%. These are the Fund's projections as reported, not
  this page's, and none enters the constants registry.

- Michelle Chan, Martha Muir, Rafe Rosner-Uddin and Lee Harris, "The
  multiplying risks of financing data centres", FT The Big Read, 26 August
  2026. Quoted claims: $7tn expected into data centres by 2030; hyperscalers
  tapping the $11.7tn US corporate debt market; $500bn of financing for Nvidia
  arranged by six firms in August; a QTS bond sold at 5.7% in April against
  over 7.2% on its new debt in August; Munich Re's largest natural-catastrophe
  exposure of €8.5bn against single-site construction costs above $10bn; only
  a fraction of Meta's $14bn Texas data centre insured; Oracle downgraded by
  S&P to triple B minus with a $7bn collateral requirement from Wisconsin's
  utility regulator. All are the article's figures (credited within it to
  Infralogic, DC Byte, Gallup and S&P among others), reproduced as attributed
  claims; none enters the constants registry. Oracle is in the model's roster,
  so the promotion rule below applies with particular force: none of these
  figures may reach Oracle's rows or charts without reclassification.

- Ruchir Sharma, *The Economics Show* (FT), 11 September 2026, interviewed by
  Chris Giles. Reading-page entry added 2026-09-11; the argument has its own
  page, `debt.html`, and every figure attributed to him is classified in the
  "US debt and the bubble page" section below, which the reading entry
  repeats in summary. Still attributed third-party claims, still feeding
  nothing.

Entries here may be added without a constants-registry change. If a claim from
this section is ever promoted into a model on the page, it stops being a
reading entry and must be classified under the section it feeds.

## FAQ page

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| China is not an advanced economy | BIS classification, stated in the chapter itself (Ch I p. 1 discusses China under the EME heading; every cross-country graph note lists CN among EMEs, e.g. Graph 8.A's "16 AEs including EA and 22 EMEs"). Follows the IMF grouping. |
| US weight in the advanced bloc: slider 40–55%, default 47% | Page derivation: US GDP ≈ $30T of ≈ $62T advanced-economy GDP at market prices (≈48%); the BIS aggregates growth on GDP-PPP weights, which lower the US share toward ≈40–45%. The widget's formula — bloc growth = weight × US growth + (1−weight) × rest growth — is an identity; the weight is the only assumption, hence the slider. Worked default: rest at 2.25%, target 2.5%, weight 47% ⇒ required US growth 2.78%, US contribution ≈52% of bloc growth; §6 wage-par (3.2%) at those settings ⇒ ≈4.3% US growth. |

## US debt and the bubble page (`debt.html`, added 2026-09-11)

The page reads Ruchir Sharma's argument, made on the FT's *Economics Show* of
11 September 2026, against the §2 floor. It carries one interactive
construction (the floor with the required return split into the ten-year
Treasury yield and a premium) and one measured input (the yield). Everything
attributed to Sharma is an **attributed third-party claim** and feeds nothing.

| Page claim | Source & status |
|---|---|
| Sharma's figures: about $1T a year of AI infrastructure spending worldwide against about $200B of AI revenue, a gap of at least $800B a year, part paid from the builders' other businesses and the rest raised as bonds or new shares; a US deficit of about 6% of GDP, or about $2T of borrowing a year; federal debt of about $40T gross and about $32T net of intra-government holdings, roughly 100% of GDP against about 37% at the start of the century; an interest bill above 3% of GDP, near $1T a year, against $800B on defence; the ten-year yield about 4% in mid-February and about 4.8% at recording; the four signs (overvaluation, over-ownership, over-investment, over-leverage) with the first three ticked and the fourth left unticked; AI investment approaching 5% of GDP; about 40% of the US market as direct AI plays; every bubble in 300 years ending as a monetary event; 5% as the line, for two reasons (a twenty-year cap, and interest above nominal growth of about 5%) | **Attributed third-party claims**, all Sharma's as given on the show, read from the FT's published transcript (ft.com/content/2980df94-8968-48b5-89f8-05ffaed20a7b), with his column of the same week ("Why America's debt binge is starting to matter", ft.com/content/8827baa7-163d-4122-9ea8-a2c9ff6e8a4d) as the second confirmation of the argument in print. None enters the constants registry; none feeds a model. The one direct quotation on the page, that AI "has now increasingly become a capital market story", is his sentence from the transcript. The $1T is a global figure and the site's $840B is the five's 2026 guides, and the page says so where it sets them side by side. Where the page says the yield was "about 4%" in mid-February, that is the host's "just under 4 per cent" checked against FRED DGS10 (4.04% on 13 Feb 2026). |
| Ten-year Treasury yield **4.95%** on 10 September 2026 (the stat strip, §2's "where the yield stands", and the slider's default) | **Reported.** Primary source: the US Treasury's daily par yield curve, 10-year column, 10 Sep 2026 = 4.95 (9 Sep = 4.83, 8 Sep = 4.80). Geoveu holds no record of the series, so per the standing rule the primary plus independent reports stands in: two market reports of the 10 Sep close at 4.95% (up 0.12 points on the day, the highest since October 2023) were read and agree. FRED series DGS10 and the Federal Reserve's H.15 release, which carry the same series a day behind, confirm 9 Sep at 4.83 and will carry 10 Sep after their next update. Registered as `tenYearYield` (value and date) and checked against the slider default, the JS constant and the page's prose. **Refresh policy:** the reading is dated on the page and moves only when the page is revised for a reason; it is not a live feed, and the slider is the reader's way to move it. |
| "Highest since October 2023, when it peaked at 4.98%"; "has not closed above 5% since July 2007" | **Reported**, from FRED DGS10 (the Fed's H.15 10-year constant-maturity series): maximum since 2008 = 4.98 on 19 Oct 2023; last observation ≥ 5.00 = 5.04 on 19 Jul 2007. Both are lookups, not constructions; neither enters the registry. Consistent with Sharma's "capped at 5 per cent for the last 20 years". |
| The split: profit investors require = ten-year yield + premium; floor = $3.5T ÷ 5 + $250B + $3.5T × (yield + premium) | **Page construction.** The §2 floor at its defaults, with the return written as two addends. `FLOOR_DEFAULTS` on the page is held equal to `index.html`'s slider defaults and the registry by the checker, as `tracking.html`'s copy is. The premium slider's default is `returnPct − tenYearYield.pct` = 10 − 4.95 = **5.05 points**, so at rest the two sliders sum to the front page's 10% and the floor is the front page's $1,300B; the checker enforces that identity. Slider ranges: yield 3–7% (from below the 2026 low of about 4% to two points above Sharma's line), premium 2–8 points (from roughly the spread on the safest corporate borrowers to a distressed one), both `step 0.05`. Sensitivity: each point on either slider adds $3,500B × 1% = **$35B a year**; the page prints it from `CAPEX_B / 100`. Worked points at the default premium: yield 5% → 10.05% → $1,301.75B; 6% → $1,336.75B; 7% → $1,371.75B. **Named limitation, stated on the page:** the premium is held fixed as the yield moves, the gentle case; in a scare spreads widen with yields (the FT's QTS bond, 5.7% → over 7.2% in four months, a 1.5-point widening that on the second slider is ≈ $52B a year), and the reader can move both sliders to see it. **Relation to the BIS:** the BIS's own sustainability test subtracts debt service (Graph 11.B notes: net economic surplus = revenue − capex − debt service, from Rungcharoenkitkul (2026b)'s contest model with cross-firm financing and debt); this floor charges a required return on all committed capital instead, which is stricter and larger at any yield, and this page changes none of that. The point-for-point transmission of the yield into the required return (premium constant) is the standard first approximation and is stated as such. |
| The front page's slider priced at 10 / 12 / 14%: floor $1.30T / $1.37T / $1.44T, multiples 9.6× / 10.1× / 10.6× of Microsoft's office business; "about $35B a year per point, about 11% across the slider" | **Page construction**, the §2 arithmetic at three settings of its own slider: 700 + 250 + 3,500 × 0.10 = 1,300; × 0.12 = 1,370; × 0.14 = 1,440 ($B). Multiples ÷ `officeTtmB` 135.3 = 9.61, 10.13, 10.64. Across the slider's 10 → 14%: +140 ÷ 1,300 = 10.8%. |
| "Six and a half times what AI earns today" | **Page construction on Sharma's figure:** the §2 floor at defaults ÷ his $200B revenue estimate = 1,300 ÷ 200 = 6.5. His figure, this site's floor; labelled as such on the page. |
| Oracle as the fourth sign already ticking: $28.5B of capital spending in the quarter, operating cash flow $23.1B, free cash flow −$5.4B, TTM capex/OCF 161% and about 244% net of $11.4B of customer prepayments, a completed $20B share sale | **Reported**, all from the §7 Oracle FY27 Q1 row (8-K of 10 Sep 2026) and `oracle.html`; nothing new is constructed here. The reading of it as Sharma's "over-leverage" is the page's interpretation, stated as such. |
| §5's circuit figures repeated: Amazon's $53.4B Anthropic gain; Anthropic and Alphabet paying SpaceX "about $2.2B a month"; SpaceX's $15.8B of AI capex in Q2 | Repeated from the §3 and §5 rows above: $1.25B + $0.92B = $2.17B a month, rounded on the page to "about $2.2B". Contract terms press-reported, as the §3 row says. |
| Builders' borrowing costs cited: SpaceX bonds at 5.855% average; QTS data-centre bond 5.7% (April) to over 7.2% (August); Oracle downgraded to triple B minus | Repeated from the tracking page (SpaceX prospectus figure) and the §8 FT Big Read entry (attributed claims). None enters the registry. |

## Constants registry (machine-checked)

`scripts/check-derivations.py` verifies these against `index.html`,
`tracking.html` and `debt.html` on every deploy. Change them here and on the page in the same commit, with a row above
explaining why.

```json
{
  "opexFixedB": 250,
  "officeTtmB": 135.3,
  "cpxSlider": { "min": 3, "max": 4.5, "default": 3.5 },
  "wcpoolSlider": { "min": 18, "max": 30, "default": 22 },
  "aiCapexPoolT": 0.84,
  "aeUsGrowthWeight": 0.45,
  "tenYearYield": { "pct": 4.95, "date": "2026-09-10" },
  "yieldSlider": { "min": 3, "max": 7, "default": 4.95 },
  "premiumSlider": { "min": 2, "max": 8, "default": 5.05 },
  "capexShareB": { "Microsoft": 190, "Amazon": 220, "Alphabet": 200, "Meta": 137.5, "Oracle": 92.5 },
  "capexShareTotalB": 840,
  "rampYears": [2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031],
  "rampFrac": [0, 0.13, 0.36, 0.52, 0.68, 0.84, 1.0],
  "cy2023BaselineB": { "Microsoft": 227.6, "Alphabet": 307.4, "Amazon": 574.8, "Meta": 134.9, "Oracle": 51.6 },
  "trendGrowth": { "Microsoft": 0.115, "Alphabet": 0.087, "Amazon": 0.118, "Meta": 0.157, "Oracle": 0.121 }
}
```